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Judicial Review in Local Government Law:
A Reappraisal
Harold H. Bruff*
Judicial review of actions taken by the cities' has traditionally fallen into three distinct stages. First, since cities receive
their power to govern from the states,2 courts examine the delegating statute for state and federal constitutional validity. Second, courts determine whether the local exercise of power is
within the terms of the delegating statute. Third, they examine
the local ordinance or administrative action itself for state and
federal constitutional validity, concentrating on due process and
equal protection requirements. It is the thesis of this Article
that, as presently applied, this three-tiered mode of analysis inadequately controls the cities in the exercise of their powers. Focusing on the state courts,3 the Article therefore suggests a form
of review that will provide the necessary control. The three
stages of the traditional review process provide a framework for
analysis. 4 The Article describes present doctrines and discusses
their deficiencies. Finally, it outlines a proposal for reform.
The Article recommends that the state courts focus principally on the local exercise of power- but with a lessened emphasis on statutory authorization and broad constitutional doctrine and an increased emphasis on forcing the cities to reform
*

Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University.

1. Unless otherwise indicated, terms such as "city," "local gov-

ernment," and "municipality" are used in the generic sense to include all technical categories of general purpose local governments, such
as towns, villages, and cities. Much of what follows applies as well to
special function districts and to counties.
2. See text accompanying notes 43-49 infra. This Article does not
deal with the unusual situation in which a city receives power directly
from the federal government, without state participation in the delegation. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 60 Wash. 2d

66, 371 P.2d 938 (1962).

3. The role of the federal courts in deciding local government cases

is receiving sufficient attention in general discussions of federal constitutional law. This Article focuses on the more neglected role of the state
courts, discussing federal constitutional law only as it bears on them.
4. The special status of "home rule" cities demands a distinct
analytical framework. It is discussed separately in text accompanying
notes 209-20 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 72-80; 117-219 infra.
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their own governmental processes by instituting standards (substantive rules) and procedures to diminish arbitrariness. 6 This
prescription is intended to place judicial review within appropriate bounds. The alternative of attempting to force state legislatures to control the cities would unnecessarily aggrandize the
courts' role by increasing the number of decisions declaring statutory delegations of power unconstitutional. Conversely, the
present practice of deferring excessively to both state and local
action unnecessarily diminishes that role.
The suggested requirement for local standards and procedural safeguards raises complex implications for the conduct of
local government. This Article explores some of them in a
preliminary fashion and identifies -the limits of their effectiveness. It then argues that in some situations, judicial supervision
of statutes delegating power to the cities remains a necessity.
I.

THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL CONTROL OF CITY
GOVERNMENT

The first task in examining judicial review of the actions of
local governments is to identify the reasons why courts should
impose controls on the cities-whether directly, by reviewing
their conduct, or indirectly, by reviewing delegating statutes for
the presence of appropriate limitations on their power. Since
state decentralization through the formation of local governments increases political accountability, 7 perhaps it should not
be subjected to judicial control.8 And since the city council, the major recipient of this state power, is politically responsible through the electoral process, perhaps it should be accorded the latitude courts have traditionally extended to
legislatures. But reflection on the characteristics of local government reveals a number of reasons for imposing substantial judicial restraint somewhere in the decentralization process.
The question whether courts should constrain statutory delega6. This recommendation has its source in an analogous context. See
1 K. DAvis, ADmmsRAVv LAW TaEATis §§ 2.00-.17 (Supp. 1970), urging
courts to force administrative agencies to confine their own discretion
through rulemaking and fair procedures. Of course such requirements
have different implications for local governments than for administrative
agencies. See notes 117-219 infra and accompanying text.
7. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmIV sTRATIVE ACTION 54
(abr. ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
8. See Gino's of Maryland, Inc. v. Mayor, 250 Md. 621, 244 A.2d
218 (1968); LaRoque v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 329, 196 A.2d
902 (1964).
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tions or local exercises of power (or both) can be reserved for
the moment.
First, municipal actions frequently have important effects
beyond the city limits. For example, statutes often authorize
cities to impose land use regulations or to exercise the power of
eminent domain beyond their borders.2 Since such extraterritorial powers affect persons not represented in the city government, the absence of political controls suggests the advisability
of judicial ones.' 0 But not only extraterritorial powers create
external, or "spillover" effects-they are present in many if not
all local exercises of power." For example, spillovers inhere
in exclusionary zoning. 1 2 When a city excludes a particular
land use, such as apartments, mobile homes, or low-income housing, its action affects persons in other communities, who may
be precluded from settling in the offending city. Moreover, as
concentrations of these comparatively burdensome land uses develop in other communities, their residents may be forced to bear
13
increased costs for municipal services.
Second, state court decisions often reflect an unarticulated
distrust of city government,' 4 which commentators have attributed in part to the historical reputation of the cities for corruption."; A more theoretical reason for this distrust is the danger
9. See generally 1 C. ANTIEAu, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§
5.10-.12 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ANTiEAu]; F. SENGsTocK, ExTRAPowERs n Tru METROPOLrrAN AREA (1962).
10. See F. ICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVENENT
nmTURBAN AREAs 250 (1970, Supp. 1972) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNTERRITORIAL

MENT IN URBAN AREAS].

11.

See generally G. BREAK,

INTERGOVERNAENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS

iN THE UNITED STATES 63-74 (1967); W. HIRscH, THE ECONoMICs OF STATE
Am LOCAL GOVERNMENT 9-10 (1970); U.S. ADVISoRY Comm'N ON INTERGOVERNiMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 6 (1966); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under
Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 700-07 (1964)

[hereinafter cited as Sandalow].
12. See generally R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING, LAND

UsE

REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE

1970's (1973); Sager,

Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
13. See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (affirming
a federal court's dismissal for want of standing of a series of plaintiffs
attempting a broadly based attack on urban exclusionary zoning);
Note, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent Federal and
State Court Approaches, 4 FouAmuv URBAN L.J. 147 (1975).
14. See generally Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78
HARv. L. REv. 1596 (1965).
15. E.g., M. RoyKo, Boss (1971); L. STFFENS, THE SHAME OF THE
CITIES (Am. Cent. ed. 1960); White, Municipal Affairs Are Not Political,
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that majority interests will oppress minorities in the local political process.1 6 The problem was identified as early as the Federalist Papers:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the
distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority
be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass
will they conwithin which they are placed, the more easily
cert and execute their plans of oppression.' 7
Thus a central danger is that the formation of stable factions
will break down the normal political process of negotiation and
compromise that ordinarily prompts courts to refuse to intervene in political decisionmaking.18 At the local level, population groupings may be relatively homogeneous 9 and political
issues relatively few and fundamental. If one group is able to
form a majority on most issues of local importance without
having to pay regard to the presence or intensity of minority
opposition, favoritism or oppression can easily occur. And since
local governments possess power to resolve important and sensitive issues, such as to define misdemeanors and to regulate land
use, the consequences of abuse of power can be severe.20
Third, the danger of municipal abuses of power is aggravated by the absence of complicated checks and balances in local
governmental structure. Although delegations commonly include a mixture of legislative, executive, and judicial types of
power, as in zoning,2 ' local governments ordinarily lack clear
structural separations of power-their primary decisional body
in URBAN GOVERNMENT 271 (E. BA
LEE&.
rev. ed. 1969). But see note
95 infra.
16. The phenomenon is described in detail in Note, supra note 14.
See also Sandalow, supra. note 11, at 710-12.
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (New Am. Lib. ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
18. Cf. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627-28
(1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 570 (1964); Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401, 507-08 (1967), affirmed sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). But cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
19. See U.S. NATIONAL AiVSORY CoMm'N ON CrVm DISORERS, REPORT
1 (Bantam ed. 1968); U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE TO FEDERALIsM 13-21 (1966);
U.S. ADVISORY COmm'N ON INTERGOVERNmENTAL RELATIONS, GOVERNMENT
STRUCTuRE,

ORGANIZATION, AND

PLANNING

IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

(1961).
20. See JAFFE, supra note 7, at 76-81.
21. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 482 (1968).
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is often a small, unicameral council possessing legislative and
22
executive responsibilities.
Fourth, state statutes do not ordinarily mandate local procedural safeguards 23 having the sophistication of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act.24

For all of these reasons, it is

clear that supervision of city governments is warranted. Thus,
when a lawsuit uncovers the potential for abuse of power, the
state courts must decide whether to attempt to force the legislatures to exercise more control over the cities, or whether to
undertake the supervision themselves.
HI.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE
DECENTRALIZATION

The foregoing attempted to demonstrate that local governments are in need of legal controls from some source, whether it
be the state legislature or the state courts. Statutes delegating
power to the cities both define one set of limits on local power
and necessitate judicial review of the statutory framework of
state government for federal and state constitutional sufficiency.
A. THE FOURTEENTH AmENDmENT
There is no need here for another review 25 of the vast body
of fourteenth amendment doctrine, which constrains both the
states and their local governments in many important particulars. The inquiry here is a narrow one, concentrating on the
presence and stringency of federal constitutional limits on the
process of decentralization, that is, on the statutory distribution
of power to the cities in enabling grants of varying generality.
The Supreme Court has traditionally demonstrated a
marked reluctance to supervise the states in their decentraliza22. Id.; C. AsRtmx,

STATS Am

LocAr. GovmRmbMns 200-23 (3d ed.

1972); ANEEAu, supra note 9, § 4.00. Separation of powers requirements

that are enforced against state governments are not extended to the
cities. See note 126 infra.
23. R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAmE 154-56 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as BABCOCK]; 1 K. DAviS, ADm3N STRATI
LAW TREAT SE § 2.10 (1958,
Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as DAvis].
24. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
25. For recent discussions citing the earlier ones, see Gellhorn &
Hornby, ConstitutionalLimitations on Admissions Proceduresand Standards-Beyond Affirmative Action, 60 VA. L. REv. 975 (1974); Wilkinson,
The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces
of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. Rnv. 945 (1975).
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tion of power. 26 The major modern exception has been reapportionment. 27 The Court's general diffidence and its particular
activism reflect the pursuit of a value of unfettered local
self-government, qualified by a high regard for equality in voting.28 The qualification suggests that when decentralization
causes unequal treatment of citizens in important respects,
the Court might intervene for the limited purpose of ensuring
that the framework of state government is fairly and equally
however, the Court has
constituted. In a series of recent cases,
29
reconfirmed its tradition of restraint.
The most comprehensive recent challenge to the current
structure of state and local government occurred in the landmark school finance case, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.30 The Texas school financing scheme under
attack depended in part, as does American local government finance generally, on the real property tax, the fund-raising capacity of which varies with the value of taxable property in the
jurisdiction. As a result, the poorest school district involved in
26. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-32 (1962); Seeley,
The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript to
Reitman v. Mulkey, 55 CoRNELL L. REv. 381, 905-10 (1970). See also San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 n.66 (1973)
("this court has never questioned the State's power to draw reasonable distinctions between political subdivisions within its borders"); id.
at 54 n.110 ("This Court has never doubted the propriety of maintaining
political subdivisions within the States and has never found in the Equal
Protection Clause any per se rule of 'territorial uniformity.'"); Griffin
v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551 (1954);
Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1879).
27. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Hadley
v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474 (1968). Salyer and Mahan seem to represent a reining in
of the reapportionment line. See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87
H_ v. L. REv. 1, 85-105 (1973). The de jure segregation cases do not
represent another exception, since they :Eocus upon findings of racial discrimination, not on impermissible kinds of decentralization. See, e.g.,
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
28. The Court's regard for local self-government surfaced recently
in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-43 (1974), and cases cited. For
the proposition that equal treatment in voting is a fundamental right
meriting strict equal protection review, see San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973).
29. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971).
30. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See gene.rally The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, 87 HAnv. L. REV. 1, 105-16 (1973). The Court repeatedly indicated
awareness that its resolution of the case would have a profound impact
on American state and local governmen. 411 U.S. at 6, 17, 40-44, 53-59.
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the case would have had to impose a tax rate more than eight
times that of the richest in order to raise the same amount of
local funds for education.3 1 State and federal grants, however,
reduced the disparity in total expenditures to the extent that
the poorest district had about 60 percent of the total funds for
to the richest district during one of the years
education available
32
in question.
The Supreme Court reviewed the funding discrepancy under the traditional rationality standard despite the claim that
strict scrutiny should apply. 33 Refusing to find wealth discrimination, the Court distinguished its earlier cases 34 on the ground
that in Rodriguez no child was deprived of an education-the
disadvantages due to less funding were only relative, not absolute. Moreover, the Court concluded that the financing scheme
was too complex to allow the identification of any manageable
class of persons disadvantaged on a wealth basis. 35 The Court
held the Texas scheme rational on the ground that it furthered
the legitimate state purpose of ensuring a degree of local control
over education. 30
For present purposes, the importance of Rodriguez is that
it unequivocally prevents the use of strict equal protection review to force a general restructuring of state and local government.37 The fourteenth amendment does not subject the states
to a general duty to show compelling reasons for substantial disparities in treatment of their citizens due to decentralization.8
31. 411 U.S. at 67 (White, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 11-14 (majority opinion).
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at 20-22 (distinguishing, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395
(1971); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. fllinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956)).
35. 411 U.S. at 18-29. Both grounds advanced by the Court for distinguishing the earlier wealth discrimination cases are open to serious
question. First, the earlier cases can be regarded as involving relative
deprivations, see id. at 118-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting); second, a sufficiently precise class for analytical and remedial purposes would seem to
have been those persons living in districts with less tax base than the
state average. See id. at 20 & n.51 (majority opinion); id. at 91 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). For the current state of health of the wealth discrimination line of cases, see generally Wilkinson, supra note 25, at 999-1017.
36. 411 U.S. at 49-55.
37. The Court's rigid two-tier equal protection approach has been
under heavy attack from the scholars for some time, and there are indications that the Court sometimes departs from it in favor of a more flexible
approach. The articles cited in note 25 supra summarize the controversy.
The point here is not that the Court should have taken a more flexible
approach in Rodriguez, but that it did not do so.
38. In Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the cross-district
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Indeed, the extent to which the Court will likely defer to state
judgments concerning the wisdom of particular distributions of
power between the state and its local governments is shown by
its approval of the Texas scheme despite substantial differences
both in local power to raise school funds, and in ovegall school
expenditures.3 9 Apparently, the equal protection clause allows
a state to structure its internal organization in any fashion that
is facially neutral and has some rational tendency to promote
a legitimate governmental end, des-pite the presence of substantial resulting inequalities in the treatment of its citizens. The
Court's restraint was surely due in part to its perception of the
difficulty of distilling manageable classifications for equal protec40
tion purposes from the complexities of state decentralization.
Values of federalism and judicial self-restraint also help to explain the Court's attitude. Of course, cases involving suspect classifications or fundamental rights as the Court has defined them
still merit strict equal protection review.4 1 And the possibility
remains that in a given case, the Court may find an impermis42
sible purpose that invalidates purportedly neutral state action.
busing case, the Court made it clear that local boundaries drawn without
a demonstrable impermissible purpose, such as racial discrimination, are
not subject to invalidation under the equal protection clause, despite the
effect of de facto segregation resulting from the decentralization of
power. The Court held that a district court may not order desegregation
relief that ignores school district lines unless the lines themselves are
the result of constitutional violations, or unless a violation in one district
has caused provable segregative effects in another. Id. at 744-49.
39. Id. at 50-51, 54-55. The presence of defects in the Texas scheme
was conceded by all. See id. at 17, 58; id.. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Mr. Justice White dissented on grounds that the delegated power of local
choice was so meaningless as to render the scheme arbitrary. Id. at 6370.
40. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), which upheld a provision of the California constitution subjecting low-rent housing projects
to mandatory referendum approval. The Court rejected a wealth discrimination argument on the ground that California had not singled out
low-rent housing for special treatment since the referendum requirement
also applied to some other questions of long-term importance to the community, such as bonding and annexations. The Court cautioned against
attempts to determine whether neutral governmental structure operates
in a given case to disadvantage "any of the diverse and shifting groups
that make up the American people." Id. at 142. See generally Lefcoe,
The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court,
59 CALi'. L. REv. 1384 (1971).
41. Rodriguez took a restrictive approach to the availability of strict
equal protection review. The Court observed that wealth discrimination
alone had never been held sufficient to invoke strict scrutiny, 411 U.S.
at 29, and declined to define education as a fundamental right. Id. at
29-39.
42. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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For the most part, however, current fourteenth amendment doctrine seems a poor tool for judicial review of state decentralization; perhaps state constitutional law can provide a better one.
That inquiry follows.
B.

STATE CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW:

THE DELEGATION DOcTRN

The polestar for state law doctrines defining the city-state
relationship is a theoretical concept of the source of local power.
It is commonly said that the cities receive all their power from
the states: No generally recognized right to self-government
inheres in the cities. 43 This conclusion stems from a basic constitutional premise that all legislative power not allocated elsewhere by state or federal constitution vests in the state legislature.4 4 The legislature accordingly holds plenary power over
local governments, which are mere subordinate instrumentalities
of the state.45 For the most part, local governments lack even the
dignity of federal constitutional protection against state legislative interference. 46 A doctrine of state legislative supremacy
43. A doctrine recognizing a right to local self-government enjoyed
some support in the late nineteenth century, but was soon repudiated
and seems to have no significant force today. See ANT=AU, supra note
9, §§ 1.01, 2.00, 2.06; I J. DILLON, Coln/m APRs ON THE LAW OF MumCIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 98-99 (5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as DILLoN];
Sandalow, supra note 11, at 646 n.ll; McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right to Local Self-Government (pts. 1-2), 16 COLUm. L. REv. 190,
299 (1916); Lutz v. City of Longview, 83 Wash. 2d 566, 520 P.2d 1374
(1974); Paddock v. Town of Brookline, 347 Mass. 230, 197 N.E.2d 321
(1964). The question of a right to local self-government in state law
should be distinguished from a value of local self-government accorded
deference by the Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
Also, local power can come directly from the federal government. See
note 2 supra.
44. See generally sources cited in note 43 supra; T. COOLEY, CoNSTIT UINAL LnMTATiONs 173-88, 389-400 (8th ed. 1927). One should recognize that constitutional limits on a legislature's power may be without
explicit textual basis: The right to travel and the right of privacy are
examples.
45. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392 (1970); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 17879 (1907); ANTIEAU, supra note 9, §§ 1.01, 2.00, 2.06. The major qualification to the plenary nature of this power lies in limitations on state power
to divest localities of property without compensation. See generally
Note, The Sovereign's Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of Public Property, 67 CoLuM. L. REV. 1083 (1967). Another possible qualification might be that a city cannot be forced to lay a tax for purely municipal purposes. See Sandalow, supra note 11, at 646 n.11.
46. Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36 (1933) (privileges and immunities); Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923) (equal protection)
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (contract and due process
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seems incongruous in view of the early and universal American
practice of creating local governments having some practical independence 4 7 and perhaps more visibility to their citizens than
the state governments. 48 But the important point is that the doctrine remains as an initial premise, and any alteration in the relationship between state and local governments must consider
it as such. 49

The doctrine of state legislative supremacy must be seen in
relation to another ancient constitutional tenet, based on the separation of powers principle, which holds that power vested by
the constitution in the legislature may not be delegated. 50 The
policies underlying separation of powers are fundamental: first,
protection against arbitrariness through the prevention of undue concentrations of power in one branch of government; second, functional efficiency through the allocation of tasks to the
branches of government best suited to exercise them. 51 Thus it
is not surprising that a rule of nondelegability arose in the state
courts, notwithstanding the absence of a recognized federal constitutional mandate that the states follow the separation of
powers principle in their internal organization.5" Some, but
clauses). Yet the source of the limits on state power to divest local governments of property may be the fourteenth amendment. See ANTmAU,
supra note 9, § 2.03; note 45 supra; Note, supra note 45. And in the rare
situations where legislative purpose to cause unconstitutional discrimination can be established, the fourteenth amendment applies. See, e.g.,
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See generally Sailors v.
Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 107-09 (1967).
47. See generally Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481
(1968); Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government (pts. 1-3), 13 HARv.
L. REv. 411, 570, 638 (1900); Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal
of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 Sup. CT. Rav. 194, 214.

48. See Dah], The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 Am. POL.
Sd. Rv.953, 968 (1967).
49. Some state constitutions partly reverse the doctrine, granting
cities direct authority to govern themselves by framing and adopting
"home rule" charters. See generally ANrmAu, supra note 9, §§ 3.00-.13.
These constitutional home rule provisions may give local governments
some freedom from legislative interference. Id. §§ 3.14-.17. And even
states without such provisions frequently impose various specific constitutional limits on legislative power over local matters. These are collected in id. §§ 2.08-.16. Unless otherwise indicated, the text deals with
the more common situation, i.e., the absence of home rule power. Home
rule is discussed in text accompanying notes 208-19 infra.
50. See generally DAvis, supra note 23, §§ 2.01-.15; JAFFE, supra note
7, at 32-34, 73-85.
51. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
52. See Avery v. Mlidland County, 3909 U.S. 474, 48D (1968); 1 F.
COOPER, STATE AD~nzmATrvE LAw 45 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
CoorER]; cf. Sailors v. Board of Educ., 3:37 U.S. 105, 109 (1967); Seeley,
supra note 26, at 905-10.
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not all, state constitutions contain a clause explicitly requiring
separation of powers, but state courts are virtually uniform in
requiring it. 58
In an absolute form, the rule of nondelegability could not
have hoped to survive, given the plain necessity for legislatures
to delegate power to administra.ive agencies and local governments. The delegation doctrine in state law has accordingly
evolved, after a period of lip service and evasion, into a recognition that delegation may occur and a requirement that legislation contain standards to guide the exercise of delegated power.5s Modem delegation doctrine thus attempts to serve the
separation of powers principle by ensuring that major policy
decisions are made by elected representatives and by facilitating judicial review. 55
Delegations to local governments raise issues somewhat different from those raised by delegations to state administrative
agencies. For the latter, the separation of powers objection is
that law-making decisions are lodged in the hands of bureaucrats, who are not elected. Since delegation to local governments
usually grants power to elected city councils, perhaps there is
no separation of powers objection. But attention to the policies
underlying separation of powers suggests that its requirements
apply here as well. First, consider the policy against undue
concentration of power in one branch of government. Prior
discussion observed that city governments lack the structural
separations of power common to state and federal government. 56
Since local governmental power is concentrated in the local legislature, a grant of unrestricted power to that body clearly gives
rise to a danger of arbitrariness. The danger is increased by the
tendency of city actions to affect unrepresented persons outside
the city limits, by the suspect nature of the local political process,
and by the frequent absence of careful procedural safeguards for
57
the exercise of local power.
The second policy underlying separation of powers requirements, functional efficiency, is relevant also. Since local governments have territorially limited jurisdictions and perspec53. See CooPER, supra note 52, at 45; JAFFE, supra note 7, at 30.
54. See sources cited in note 50 supra.
55. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); JAFFE; supra note 7, at 32-34; Bickel, Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 68 (1961).
56. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 9-24 supra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:669

tives, they are ill suited to decide matters of statewide
consequence. The state courts have recognized this shortcoming
in their application of the delegation doctrine. Not surprisingly,
they pose the issue in terms of the delegability of matters of
local or municipal concern, and the nondelegability of matters
of statewide concern. 58 The categories, however, are oversimplified: As an empirical matter, any simple cleavage allocating
issues wholly to state or city ill fits the reality of our mobile,
interdependent society.59 State and local governments share
responsibility for many functions;6 0 examples are education
and highway regulation. Given the difficulty and inappropriateness of any serious attempt to apply a distinction phrased
in terms of simplistic polarity, one might expect courts to substitute labeling for analysis. A tendency toward opacity in the
cases suggests that this has occurred. 61 Recommendations for a
method of defining more precisely the outer limits of delegation
2
to local governments appear below.C
Analysis to this point has developed the following propositions. First, state constitutional law should set limits on the
delegation of power to local governments. Second, in determining the nature of those limits, the prevention of arbitrariness in
the local exercise of power should be a principal goal. Third,
since local governments are politically responsible (unlike state
administrative agencies), the delegation of policy-making power
to them is objectionable per se ondy when it interferes excessively with policies of truly statewide importance.
The next question is how the state courts should go about
enforcing the necessary constitutional limits. The first possibility is the means traditionally chosen: a requirement for legislative standards, defined simply as the substantive resolution of
important policy issues by legislation. But before discussing
whether courts should force state legislatures to adopt standards, it is necessary to identify the functions standards can
serve in the local government context. It is clear that the state
legislature can provide some very important legal controls upon
58. GoVERNMET iN URBAN AREAs, supra note 10, at 244-48. Examples of nondelegable matters may be legislative control over the type
and rate of local taxation, cf. id. at 423-24, and home rule power in the
absence of constitutional authorization. See Sandalow, supra note 11, at
669 n.100, and sources cited.
59. GovERN-brNT IN UBAN AREAs, supranote 10, at 209-10.
60. Sandalow, supra note 11, at 656-57.
61. GovERNAmNT iN URBAN AREAs, supra note 10, at 245-46.
62. See text accompanying notes 199-207 infra.
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the cities. If harmful spillover effects accompany local action,
the legislature can remove some of them simply by changing the
city's authorized power. For example, the legislature might
forbid the city to exclude certain types of land uses. Similarly,
if the legislature mistrusts the local political process, it can set
substantive policy itself, especially for subject matter heavily
freighted with statewide interests, such as open housing. And if
the legislature finds defects in local governmental structure or
procedure, it can mandate reform.
There are, however, reasons for restraining one's enthusiasm for state legislative standards. The statehouse does not
provide the ideal vantage point from which to identify and cure
all problems of local government; city hall may often provide a
better one. And local governments and local conditions vary
widely enough to indicate that courts should hesitate to force the
resolution of all problems into the mold of a single statutory
framework. Legislative standards limiting the discretion of the
cities may achieve control at the cost of rigidity. 3 They run counter to a general modern consensus on the desirability of according
the cities broad powers to govern without explicit statutory
authorization. 64 A system favoring statutory standards would
inhibit creative government at the local level by increasing the
cities' dependence upon the legislature for authorization. 5
These policy considerations suggest that the state courts
should be cautious about imposing standards requirements on
delegations by the state legislatures. Further reasons for caution in this regard emerge from a review of the unhappy experience of the state and federal courts in attempting to enforce
statutory standards requirements.6 6 The state court decisions
usually fail to distinguish between cases involving administrative agencies and those involving local governments. However,
since the present issue is the relation of court to legislature, the
distinction is not important here. The federal decisions, of
course, are those reviewing congressional delegations to federal
agencies.
The case law reveals a tendency on the part of both the
state legislatures and Congress to delegate power without mean63. The confining effect of legislative standards is increased by the
operation of Dillon's rule, which enjoins strict construction of statutory
delegations of power to cities. See text accompanying notes 81-102 infra.
64. See Sandalow, supra note 11, at 652; text accompanying notes

90-93 infra.
65. See text accompanying notes 88-96 infra.
66. See generally sources cited in note 50 supra,

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:669

ingful standards. 67 Sometimes the legislators merely tack on
platitudinous requirements that the delegate advance the public
interest or the public health, safety-, and welfare. Of course, the
presence or absence of explicit statutory statements of policy
should not be determinative; the structure or the legislative
history of a statute may provide a court ample means to determine the policy that the delegate is to follow.68 Legislatures,
however, often attempt to delegate even the most basic policy
determinations to an agency or to local governments. The
courts must then decide whether to void the statute with an
admonition to the legislature to resolve the fundamental policy
questions. But nothing better may be forthcoming from the
legislature. The absence of policy may be due to political impasse or to a legislative judgment that it is unwise or impossible
to set policy in advance of experience."9 It is not surprising,
then, that the courts have failed to distinguish themselves in
terms of the effectiveness of their restraints on broad legisla0
tive delegations, or even in terms of predictability.
The case law applying the delegation doctrine thus reveals
that legislative standards requirements have always proved difficult to enforce, and have sometimes seemed unwise. In local
government cases, legislative standards are unnecessary unless
there is a need for statewide policy; otherwise, they tend overly
to restrict local discretion. A retreat from the standards requirement to a due process emphasis on fair administrative
procedure has appeared in some federal cases.7 1 An analogous
search for an alternative approach is in order in local government law. It is the principal recommendation of this Article
that the state courts concentrate on requirements for locally
adopted standards and procedures, and that only when a need
for statewide statutory policy renders these insufficient to control the local exercise of power should the courts invalidate
statutes delegating power to the cities for the insufficiency of
72
legislative standards.
67. Id.

68. The process is illustrated by Judge Leventhal's fine opinion in

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
69. DAvis, supra note 23, § 2.00-3 (Supp. 1970).
70. See generally COOPER, supra note 52, at 46-91; DAvis, supra note
23, §§ 2.07-.15; JAFFE, supra note 7, at 73-85.
71. See G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHoiui, THE ADMimNSTRATVE PROCESS
102-06 (1974). But see Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F.
Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971); Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHr. L. REv. 307 (1976).
72. See note 6 supra,
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In two important cases, federal courts have read the fourteenth amendment to contain a requirement for local standards
and procedures. In Hornsby v. Allen7 the Fifth Circuit required the adoption of ascertainable criteria and procedural
safeguards for the issuance of liquor licenses. In Holmes v.
New York City Housing Authority"4 the Second Circuit required the adoption of standards and fair procedures for determining eligibility for public housing. These cases raise the possibility that the fourteenth amendment will become an effective
mandate to the cities in this application. For reasons advanced
below, however, it would be unfortunate should federal constitutional law be relied on as the only source for this kind of judicial
75
control of local action.
A system favoring locally adopted standards is less rigid
than one favoring state legislative standards. It allows variation according to differences in local conditions or local preferences. And local standards are similar to administrative rules in
that they are subject to any change in prospective operation
that does not exceed legislative authorization. 0 The courts
should be more comfortable with such a system because the
cities are both more in need of judicial control than the state
legislature, and more amenable to it. They are more in need of
it for reasons already given,7 7 and because local legislation is
apt to involve strong economic or social self-interest on the part
of the city, as in exclusionary zoning.7 8 They are more amenable to it because the local council does not stand on the elevated
plane of the legislature in state constitutional law.7 9
Moreover, the need for the courts to control local governmental action is especially strong because the cities are less
73. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). For a discussion of Hornsby, see

text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
74. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968). For a discussion of Holmes, see
text accompanying note 119 infra.
75. See text accompanying notes 164-98 infra.
76. The possibility of retroactive change should not be rejected out
of hand, cf. DAVIS, supra note 23, § 5.08; the intent here is to posit the
simplest case.
77. See text accompanying notes 9-24 supra.
78. Cities differ from the state legislature in this regard because the
limited territorial jurisdiction of the city precludes effective political
pressure from the unrepresented, whereas the state legislature represents
nearly everyone who might be affected by its actions.
79. State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Mlinn. 116, 154 N.W. 750
(1915); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 580, 507
P.2d 23, 26 (1973). The statement in text is perhaps less true for some
home rule cities. See text accompanying notes 208-19 infra.
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amenable to legislative supervision than are state administrative
agencies. The cities are more numerous and more often remote
from the capital, and, above all, they have territorial political
bases of their own.
The implications and limits of the recommendation that
state delegation doctrine focus on requirements for locally
adopted standards and procedures are explored below. 0 It is
first necessary, however, to outline and evaluate the second and
third stages of traditional judicial review in local government
law. These examine local actions for statutory authorization
and for state and federal constitutionality.
III. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR LOCAL
ACTION: DILLON'S RULE
If a statutory delegation of power survives examination
for constitutional defects under the delegation doctrine, traditional judicial review proceeds to the question whether the local
action is within the terms of the authority granted. Strict construction of these statutes is mandated by another venerable
maxim of local government law, Di]lon's rule, which is ordinarily stated as follows:
It is a general and undisputed. proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses and, can exercise the following
powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily or fairly imaplied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects amd purposes of the corporation,--not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair,
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power
is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power
8
is denied. 1

In part this rule is simply a theoretical deduction from the
root principle of state legislative supremacy. 12- Having no inherent power to govern themselves, local governments must
show that state law warrants their actions. Dillon's rule seems
80. See text accompanying notes 117-219 infra.
81. DmILoN, supra note 43, § 237 (emphasis in original). See, e.g.,
City of Osceola v. Whistle, 241 Ark. 604, 410 S.W.2d 393 (1966); Nance
v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944). The usual
statement of the rule leaves courts some room to maneuver, especially
in finding implied powers. Not surprisingly, courts vary in their emphasis on the potential breadth or narrowness of the rule. See ANTmAU, supra note 9, § 5.05. Judge Dillon did not mean to be overrigid. He would
have allowed the exercise of powers "reasonably proper" to effectuate
powers expressly granted. DILLON, supra note 43, § 238, at 452.
82, See DrLLON, supra note 43, § 237, at 450; § 238, at 452.
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to have a policy basis as well-the prevention of majority oppression in city government.8 8 That is a worthy purpose, but the
rule itself is largely irrelevant to its accomplishment. Dillon's
rule directs the attention of the courts to the question whether
the city has generalized subject-matter authorization to act. The
apparent premise is that the presence of explicit legislative authority to undertake a given kind of program, such as zoning,
provides an important control upon its administration. Of course,
the legislature can qualify its delegations of power with restrictions designed to prevent arbitrariness, 84 but it does not always
do so. When it does not, Dillon's rule provides no protection
against the arbitrary exercise of a generally authorized power.8 5
It should surprise no one that the courts, supplied with a
tool so badly designed, have used it poorly. In their application
of Dillon's rule, they have tended toward literalism and inconsistency, inquiring whether the local ordinance is grammatically
within the statute's bounds without explicitly addressing its potential for abuse.8 6 Of course, both the literalism and the apparent inconsistency can be explained as a tendency of the courts
simply to state the rule but to respond in fact to its underlying
8
policy concern. 7
83. "In aggregate corporations, as a general rule, . . . the act
of a majority is deemed in law the act and will of the whole, as the act of the corporate body. The consequence is that a
minority must be bound not only without, but against, their
consent. Such an obligation may extend to every onerous duty,
-to pay money to an unlimited amount, to perform services, to
surrender lands, and the like. It is obvious, therefore, that if
this liability were to extend to unlimited and indefinite objects,
the citizen, by being a member of a corporation, might be deprived of his most valuable personal rights and liberties. The
security against this danger is in a steady adherence to the
principle stated, viz., that corporations can only exercise their
powers over their respective members, for the accomplishment
of limited and defined objects."
Id. § 238, at 451 (quoting Spaulding v. City of Lowell, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.)
71, 75 (1839)) (emphasis added by Dillon).
84. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
85. See DILLoN, supra note 43, § 239, at 453 (emphasis in original):
The rule of strict construction does not apply to the mode
adopted by the municipality to carry into effect powers expressly or plainly granted, where the mode is not limited or
prescribed by the legislature, and is left to the discretion of the
municipal authorities.
86. ANTIEAU, supra note 9, §§ 5.01-.06; GOV MVNxT IN URBAN
AREAS,

supra note 10, at 254; S. SATO & A. VAN

ALsTnE, STATE AND

91-92 (1970). See, e.g., Bredice v. City of Norwalk, 152 Conn. 287, 206 A.2d 433 (1964); Ives v. Chicago, 30 fll. 2d 582,
198 N.E.2d 518 (1964); Early Estates, Inc. v. Housing Bd. of Review,
93 R.I. 227, 174 A.2d 117 (1961).
87. See S. SATO & A. VAN ALsTYmE, supra note 86, at 90-94. Even
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Dillon's rule creates significant practical problems for both
local governments and state legislahres. Its erratic application
causes city officials to fear that authorization for local action is
absent whenever relevant legislation is less than unambiguously
explicit.88 This can cause excessive reluctance to act or frequent
resort for authorization to the legislature, which may not be disposed to grant it.8 9 One source of legislative reluctance to confer desired authority is the difficulty of drafting legislation that
will satisfy both the constitutional command of the delegation
doctrine and the practical needs of the cities. If a statute is
drawn broadly enough to confer ample power on the cities and
to avoid technical invalidations ol ordinances, the legislative
standards requirement may invalidate it. On the other hand, if
a statutory delegation is drawn with narrow specificity, it
should survive the perils of the delegation doctrine, but the
cities will have a difficult time exercising power under it without running afoul of Dillon's rule.
Another serious policy objection to Dillon's rule lies in basic
principles of governmental organization: Cities should be allowed to govern generally and not be limited to particular functions. 90 Local governments share responsibility with the states
and with the federal government over a wide range of matters.
And the cities confront a highly complex, changing set of problems to which their response can on.y be hampered by allocating
them fragmented areas of limited subject-matter jurisdiction. 91
Notice that the legislative grant of a general power to initiate
local action without explicit legislative approval does not prevent the legislature from withdrawing local authority when experience so counsels. Also, the presence of broad initiative powers does not prevent the legislature or the courts from
controlling particular exercises of appropriately delegated power by requiring local standards and procedural safeguards.
Granting initiative does not confer autonomy.92 It does eliminate worries of local officials about authority to proceed with
the untried, and it places initial legislative responsibility with
when the courts identify subject matter for which some latitude in application -of the rule is clearly appropriate, they tend to use misleading labels. See AN=A-u, supra note 9, § 5.06 (describing liberalized review
for "proprietary" functions such as -the operation of a utility).
88. Sandalow, supra note 11, at 653-56.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 656-57.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 657-58.
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the city council, presumably the body best informed about local
problems. Thus, authorizing cities to govern generally on local
matters fosters development of and choice between rational local preferences and alternatives.9 3
Legislatures have often reacted to the authorization problems caused by Dillon's rule by delegating broad powers to the
cities.9 4 It is ironic that insofar as the presence of Dillon's rule
has thus encouraged the legislature to grant powers in sweeping
and often thoughtless fashion, it has achieved the opposite of its
purpose to confine local power. Frequently, these delegations
include "general welfare" clauses apparently granting a general
power to legislate without specific statutory authority. 95
To be sure, courts do not always construe general welfare
clauses as broadly as they might. 98 But their resistance to turning
Dillon's rule inside out probably stems from several considerations: a concern about the dictates of the delegation doctrine, a
need to reconcile general welfare clauses with other, specifically
limited authorizations, and a desire to retain the power to force
legislative reappraisal of a delegation whose implementation by
the cities has raised unforeseen problems.
Continued reliance on Dillon's rule as a device to control
local governments is unwarranted. The courts should discard
the rule of strict construction; it is overrigid and counterproductive. They should seek statutory policy in the normal ways
and continue to ask whether particular local actions offend state
policy discernible in the statutes delegating power or elsewhere. 97 For example, parochial local action such as exclusion93. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
49-50 (1973).
94. State constitutional bans on special legislation applying only to
selected local governments also contribute to a need for broad delegation.
See Sandalow, supra note 11, at 649-50 n.24.
95. See generally ANTIAu, supra note 9, § 5.07. This development
may reflect a slackening of traditional distrust of city government. See
U.S. ADvisoRY ComI'N ON INTERGOVERNMIENTAL RELATIONs, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STRUcTURAL, FUNCTIONAL, AND PERsoNN
PowERs OF LOCAL GOVERNmmNT 72 (1962): "The

abuse by local government of broad powers troubles the Commission
minimally. It is not currently widespread in any serious way."
96. AxTmAU, supra note 9, § 5.07; GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS,
supra note 10, at 283-84.
97. Some state courts occasionally void local actions on grounds of
conflict with "public policy." Perhaps this is a form of preemption by
state common law. See generally S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, supra
note 86, at 95-102,
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ary zoning can be voided as ulta vires, on the ground that the
state delegates only the power to act consistently with the wel98
fare of all of its citizens.
In deciding whether to imply authority for a given local
action from a state statute, the courts should concentrate on the
dangers that inhere in the particular exercise of power and on
the presence or absence of local standards and procedures sufficient to prevent arbitrariness. There is usually no reason to forbid local experimentation unless the city's action is clearly beyond statutory authorization or is dangerously uncontrolled.
There is reason for greater caution, however, in upholding local
assertion of powers that are novel9 9 or that, however exercised,
have a special capacity for abuse.100 In these situations, a holding that statutory authorization is absent has the effect of inviting legislative consideration of the appropriateness of a particular
local program.' 0 ' The courts can also avoid deciding serious
constitutional issues by construing the local action to be unauthorized. 0 2 But the courts should be aware that the effect of
invalidating an overenthusiastic local exercise of power as unauthorized is to create a piecedent that may prevent the city from
correcting its own mistakes by passing a new ordinance with better standards and procedures. Such a holding also may deny the
power in question to all cities to which the statute applies,
regardless of their varying characteristics and needs. To avoid
98. See Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 217-18
n.6, 192 N.W.2d 322, 328 n.6 (1971); Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975);
Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 261-63, 181 A.2d 129, 145-46
(1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S.
233 (1963); BABcocK, supra note 23, at 176-83.
99. It is easier to identify the substantive limit that the legislature
intended when a broad delegation is enacted against a background of
past administrative practice by the delegate. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1 (1965). The danger is that a court will read past practice
as the limit of present authority without good reason (such as to avoid
a constitutional question), thus unduly limiting a power to experiment
that the legislature meant to confer.
100. See, e.g., City of Osceola v. Whistle, 241 Ark. 604, 410 S.W.2d
393 (1966) (taking a strict approach toward the existence of an extraterritorial eminent domain power).
101. A good example of the value of this technique is Port of New
York Authority v. Weehawken Township, 14 N.J. 570, 576-77, 103 A.2d
603, 606-07 (1954) (Brennan, J.), reading the Authority's enabling legislation narrowly to force the Authority to undergo legislative consideration of the appropriateness of building a new tunnel that would cause
substantial housing relocation.
102. E.g., City of Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 ILl. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d
116 (1966); cf. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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these results, the courts should state ultra vires holdings as
narrowly as possible.
IV. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW OF
LOCAL ACTION
Local governmental actions found to be within the terms of
a valid delegation must still satisfy the requirements of state
and federal due process and equal protection clauses. For
present purposes, it is important to observe how the fourteenth
amendment's test of rationality operates, and how it interrelates
with the other stages of judicial review. 0 3 Rationality review
is illustrated by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas,:0 4 an exclusionary zoning case. The village's ordinance permitted only one-family dwellings and excluded all multiple occupancy. It defined a "family" as persons
related by blood, adoption, or marriage and living together as
a unit, or as a number of persons not exceeding two, not related
by blood or marriage, but living together. Six university students leased a house and challenged the ordinance. The Court
began by reviewing its landmark decision upholding the zoning
power, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.10 5 Euclid had
upheld zoning classifications against fourteenth amendment attack by placing some emphasis on the prevention of identifiable
harm such as fire hazards and overcrowding.10 6 In Boraas, the
Court cautioned that Euclid also established that "those historic
police power problems need not loom large or actually be existent
in a given case.' 0 7 The Court reasoned that existing nuisancelike problems need not be proved because cities need reasonable
103. Cases involving fundamental rights and suspect classifications
as the Supreme Court has defined them merit far stricter review. See
text accompanying notes 25-42 supra. The purpose here is to outline existing review used for the bulk of cases, in order to judge its effectiveness. Of course, state courts can read state equal protection and
due process clauses to impose more stringent requirements than their
federal counterparts. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting). They usually do not do
so, however. See ANTiEAU, supra note 9, §§ 5.18, .20. Whether they
should is considered in text accompanying notes 164-98 infra. Some state
courts profess the power to invalidate local actions for unreasonableness
without reaching constitutional issues. GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS,
supra note 10, at 286; Sandalow, supranote 11, at 673 n.117, 709 n.261.
104. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
105. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
106. Id. at 388; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974).
107. 416 U.S. at 4.
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margins to ensure effective enforcement, and because imperfections inhere in any attempt to draw legislative lines across the
subtle shadings of reality.10 8 As a result, the Court gave its
sanction to all "fairly debatable" zoning classifications. 10 9 Moreover, the Court in Boraas broadened the permissible purposes
of zoning from the nuisance analogies of Euclid to the almost
unconfined aesthetic and preferential values recognized in Berman v. Parker:10 "'It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.'""'
The plaintiffs in Boraas contended that the ordinance burdened rights of travel, association, and privacy. But these claims
were swiftly dispatched. Reviewing the ordinance for rationality
only, the Court characterized it as economic and social legislation,
whose imperfections short of complete irrationality should be tolerated." 2 Since boarding houses could cause overcrowding or
noise, the ordinance survived. Thus Boraas fails significantly to
restrain local legislation."13 A standard of overall rationality
and a recognition of broad value preferences as legitimate police
power purposes combine to render local legislative exercises of
108. Id. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.

365, 388-89 (1926).
109. 416 U.S. at 4 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
110. 348 U.S. 26 (1958).
111. 416 U.S. at 6 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1958)).
112. Significantly, the Court did not seize the opportunity offered it
by the opinion of the Second Circuit, which had applied a standard of review more demanding than traditional rationality review, yet less so
than strict scrutiny. See Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806,
814-18 (2d Cir. 1973). Such an intermediate standard would require that
the legislative classification be substantially related in fact to a legitimate purpose. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv.

4, 124-28 (1974). The appropriateness of adopting such a "strict rationality" test in state local government law is appraised below. See
text accompanying notes 193-98 infra. One reason for the rejection of
strict rationality review in Boraasmay have been the difficulty of applying it to the broad, subjective purposes that the Court recognized as valid
pursuits of zoning.
113. A caveat is in order. Because of the Court's reliance on Euclid
and Berman, the precedential value of Boraas beyond land-use regulation
is unclear. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAv. L. REv. 41, 129
(1974).
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powers such as zoning
very difficult to overturn under the equal
114
protection clause.
That present doctrines of judicial review in local government cases reduce the effectiveness of the courts is shown by
the relationship between review of local ordinances for constitutional rationality and their review for statutory authorization
under Dillon's rule. The courts should read enabling statutes
broadly for the existence of various powers, in order to prevent
constant pilgrimages to the legislature, but they should be more
strict in deciding whether a particular exercise of a concededly
legitimate power is reasonable.- 15 Instead, they theoretically
exercise strict review in determining whether the power is authorized by statute, and exercise leniency in reviewing the local
action for rationality." 6 The issue never becomes clearly focused on whether more can be done to prevent arbitrariness in
local government.
V. THE EFFECTS OF REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCAL
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES UPON CITY
GOVERNMENT
Judicial review in local government law is presently far less
effective than it should be. The remainder of this Article focuses on the implications for the courts and the cities of the prescription for reform advanced above-that the courts should concentrate on requirements for locally adopted standards and procedures; only when these cannot sufficiently control the exercise
of local power should courts require state legislatures to include
such controls within statutory delegations." 7 The ultimate
goal has been well stated in an analogous context:
[J]udicial review alone can correct only the most egregious
abuses. Judicial review must operate to ensure that the administrative process itself will confine and control the exercise
of discretion.... When administrators provide a framework
for principled decision-making, the result will be to diminish
the importance of judicial review by enhancing the integrity of

114. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (lack of standing
to challenge urban exclusionary zoning).
115. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d
23 (1973).
116. E.g., Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129
(1962), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963); Mobil

Oil Corp. v. City of Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23, 309 N.E.2d 900 (1974);

see Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HAv. L. REV.
1154, 1157-58 (1955).

117. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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the administrative process, and to f5nprove the quality of judicial review in those cases where judicial review is sought.l18
The first task is to identify the particular functions that standards and procedural safeguards can perform in city government.
Essentially, a requirement for local standards will force the
cities to set clear substantive policy. The value of this is demonstrated by Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority,119 in
which persons eligible for low-rent public housing challenged the
procedures used by the Housing Authority in admitting tenants.
The Authority received 90,000 applications per year but could admit only about 10,000 families to public housing. The plaintiffs
claimed that the Authority did not process applications in accordance with reasonable and ascertainable standards. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, holding that due process
required selections among eligible applicants to be made in accordance with ascertainable standards. The court then said that
if many applicants were equally qualified under the standards,
further selections must be made in some nondiscriminatory fashion, such as in the chronological order of application. While
Holmes may present a situation ideally suited to rulemaking,
when it is impossible or unwise to formulate specific rules in
advance of experience, standards can be developed in case-bycase adjudication. Either way, standards increase governmental
predictability, advance equality in application, and insulate ad20
ministration from political pressure.
Standards are important, but -they cannot ensure effective
control of governmental action uness they are combined with
procedural safeguards. 121 Experience in zoning variance administration demonstrates the problem: Local boards of adjustment have consistently ignored statutory standards that supposedly restrict the availability of variances to cases of "unnecessary hardship.'1 22 The wholesale granting of variances has re118. Environmental Defense Fund, ]hc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,
598 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, 3.) (footnotes omitted).
119. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
120. See generally IL FmENDLY, Tnu FEDERAL ADMIIsTRATnIVE AGENcIES: THE NEED PoR BEttm DsFINmox or STANDARDS 19-24 (1962).
121. See Schmidt v. Department of Resource Dev., 39 Wis. 2d 46, 158
N.W.2d 306 (1968).
122. See MODEL LAND DEVELopmENm: CODE 51-52 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Mo:DEL CODE]; C. HAAR, LAND USE

PLANNnqG 295-96 (2d ed. 1971); Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power,
29 M. L. REV. 1 (1969); Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 7,
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sulted in frequent judicial reversals in the small percentage of
cases that have produced litigation, but more effective control
at the administrative level is needed. 1 23 Procedural safeguards
can provide it and can produce an administrative record that fa24
cilitates judicial review.1
The functions of standards and procedures are no mystery;
the harder questions arise in attempting to apply them to the
present structure of city government. Courts that have required
local standards and safeguards have found it difficult to characterize and control city council actions that formally constitute
legislation but functionally resemble adjudication. 25 The problem is a pervasive one because the blending of legislative and
administrative functions in the city council is common in American local government. 1 2 6 In Hornsby v. Allen,12 7 for example,
an unsuccessful applicant for a liquor license sued the Mayor
and Board of Aldermen of Atlanta, alleging that although she
met all the requirements for a license, her application had been
arbitrarily denied. Granting the defendants' motion to dismiss,
the federal district court reasoned that the case involved legislative action by a local legislative body and that procedural due
process requirements thus did not apply. The court of appeals
reversed. It observed that although a legislative body had taken
the challenged action, the decision amounted to adjudication of
a particular case 28 rather than passage of a general legislative
rule. By contrast, the court noted, promulgation of standards
to be met in order to obtain a license would constitute legislation,
since decision would rest on fact premises not related to a parreprinted in 4 R. ANDEnsoN, A-VicAN LAw or ZONING § 26.01 (1968)

[hereinafter cited as SZEA].
123. MODEL CODE, supra note 122, at 51-52.
124. See Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d 385 (1952); DAvis, supra
note 23, §§ 2.08-.09.
125. A vivid example of judicial confusion on this score is provided
by the original majority and en banc majority opinions in South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 491 F.2d 5
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 (1974). For the other
cases, see sources cited in notes 130 and 132 infra.
126. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra. Local governments
are not held subject to state separation of powers requirements. See
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d
28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974); County Council v. Investors
Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973); Smith v. Township of
Hazlet, 63 N.J. 523, 309 A.2d 210 (1973).
127. 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). See text accompanying note 73
supra.
128. 326 F.2d at 608. See generally K. DAvis, ADI NisTRAnVm LAw
TEXT § 7.03 (3d ed. 1972).
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ticular party. Thus the court held that if the aldermen had established no ascertainable standards by which an applicant could
seek to qualify for a license, the district court must enjoin license
denials until a standard had been established and due process
provided.
One more illustration is necessary to provide grist for analysis. The major current controversy in local government law
concerns zoning ordinance amendments that affect only a single
tract or a limited portion of the city. Theoretically, these
amendments reflect general planning considerations, such as a
need for more shopping centers. If treated as legislation, they
would ordinarily receive only rationality review. 129 But there
are signs that the process is in reality an essentially unplanned
administrative means of controlling development by ad hoc
grant or denial of requests for a'mendments according to the
130
subjective desirability of the particular development proposal.
Discriminatory administration, often feared in local government,
13
can readily occur.
Some courts and scholars, following the approach of Hornsby and emphasizing the reliance of such rezonings on "adjudicative" facts concerning particular parties, have called for the
application of trial-type procedural safeguards in all such situations.132 They distinguish decisions based on "legislative"
determinations of broader issues of fact and policy, for which
procedures typical of rulemaking or legislation are more appropriate. But suppose the council[ rezones a somewhat larger
129. Compare Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507
P.2d 23 (1973), with South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
901 (1974). See generally Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product
of Judicialor Quasi-JudicialAction, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 130 (1972).
130. See Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Udell
v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968); Brough,
Flexibility Without Arbitrariness in the Zoning System: Observations
on North CarolinaSpecial Exception and Zoning Amendment Cases, 53
N.C.L. REv. 925, 925-26 (1975). See generally D. MANELKER, THE ZONiNG DmIEMMA (1971).

131. See JAFE, supra note 7, at 76-81.
132. South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 (1974);
Ward v. Village of Skokie, 26 I.. 2d 415, 186 N.E.2d 529 (1962); Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Chrobuck v. Snohomish
County, 78 Wash. 2d 884, 480 P.2d 489 (1971); BABcOCK, supra note 23,
at 157-59; Brough, supra note 130, at 945-47; Sullivan, Araby Revisited:
The Evolving Concept of ProceduralDue Process Before Land Use Regulatory Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 50 (1974); Comment, supra note
129.
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area, or advances general, "legislative" reasons for its decision. To ask whether adjudicative or legislative facts are the
ground of decision becomes oversimplified, since both may be
involved. 133 The question also suggests an unnecessary and
therefore unwise inquiry into the motive for decision.13 4
This approach errs in attempting to characterize a governmental decision according to a predominant focus that it may
well lack, and in imposing blanket procedural requirements that
may therefore be inappropriate in a given case. The confusion is
understandable; it traces to the theoretical difficulty of ultimate
distinctions between rulemaking and adjudication.

35

But a

practical resolution of the problem is crucial to the enforcement
of a requirement for local standards and safeguards.
There is a way out of this morass, suggested by current
developments in federal administrative law. 36 First, local governments require discretion to decide whether to proceed principally through rulemaking or through adjudication in a given
situation. 37 The courts can grant the cities this flexibility, yet

force them to adapt the procedures they provide to the issues involved. Essentially, this approach contemplates engrafting
some adjudicative procedures upon proceedings otherwise typical of rulemaking. It should be accomplished as follows.
Local standards will ordinarily emerge from legislative, or
rule-making, proceedings. Experience indicates that courts can
review rules effectively only if they are accompanied by statements of the reasons for their adoption.

38

Such statements allow

the courts to identify the broad issues of "legislative" fact and
policy upon which rules ordinarily rest, and to judge accordingly

their rationality and conformity to statutory authority.13 9
Statements of reasons should be routinely required for city
133. Hyson v. Montgomery County Council, 242 Md. 55, 217 A.2d 578,
584 (1966).
134. See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
135. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADiMNSTRATIVE LAw § 55 (1976).
136. See generally Pedersen, FormalRecords and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U.
Cm. L. REv. 401 (1975).
137. Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
138. See, e.g., Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Comm'n,
477 F.2d 402, 408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Uxioim LAW ComMnRs, REVISED MODEL STATE ADMvnSTATIm PROCEDURE ACT § 3 (1961); cf. Administrative Procedure Act § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
139. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
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ordinances and rules. It was observed earlier that proceedings
formally denominated rulemaking often focus to at least some
extent on "adjudicative" facts. When a rule depends for its
validity on the identification and resolution of specific factual
issues, the courts should require the rule-making proceeding to
contain procedures appropriate to the resolution of such issues,1 40 for example, cross-examination' 4' and formal findings
of fact.142 Thus, to the extent that, adjudicative fact issues are
significant determinants of a standard, the use of some trialtype procedures may be appropriate to formulation of the standard.
This approach recognizes that the most appropriate occasion
for developing the specific factual bases for standards is the
rule-making proceeding itself, not an after-the-fact judicial proceeding. 143 Factual development at the earlier stage should promote improvement in the substance of standards, and standards
should themselves improve the substantive quality of local decisionmaking. For example, cities forced to elaborate their criteria
for zoning amendments would have to make the hard planning
decisions that they now tend to abjure through the use of an
ad hoe zoning system.
When local governments proceed not by rulemaking but by
adjudication or informal procedure, the courts find themselves
on relatively solid ground. For insofar as state legislatures have
failed to impose detailed procedural requirements upon the
cities,' 44 the responsibility to ensure fair local procedure has devolved upon the courts. Perhaps the federal procedural due
process cases will provide most of the impetus for reform in the
immediate future, both in situations calling for full trial-type
hearings'4 5 and in those calling for more informal safeguards. 4"
140. See generally Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499

F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
141. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615,
651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring); Hamilton, Procedures
for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAIZF. L. REv. 1276,
1333-36 (1972); cf. Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 87071, 480 P.2d 489, 496 (1971).
142. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238,
1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
143. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615,
651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
144. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
145. The principal case is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
See also Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1964).
146. The principal case is Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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Of course, the precise nature of procedures afforded should vary
with the subject matter involved.147 And while the federal due
process cases balance the interests of the individual against
those of the government in a search for the minimum protections required by the Constitution,'148 the state courts can require more detailed procedures. The due process cases emphasize functional considerations; 4 9 the question here is
whether a particular procedural device has sufficient utility in
resolving the issues found in a given kind of case to warrant its
imposition on the city. For example, unless specific issues of
fact need resolution, trial-type procedures will prove wasteful.
A standard compendium for a full trial-type hearing would
include notice and an opportunity to be heard under procedures
published in advance, an opportunity to present and rebut evidence through counsel, the examination under oath of witnesses
whose presence is compelled and who are subject to reasonable
cross-examination, and the exclusion of irrelevant or unreliable
evidence.'5 9 The decisional body must be impartial, without
conflicts of interest or ex parte contacts.' 5' Decisions would be
made solely on the record and would include specific findings
and reasons supported by the record, 52 instead of the boilerplate findings sometimes encountered at present. 53 For situations calling for less formal procedural protections, the courts
could begin with the proposition that requirements for an opportunity to meet opposing evidence and for a reasoned administrative decision are fundamental. 154
147. See generally K. DAvis, DIscRETIONARY JusTicE 97-141 (1971).
148. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
149. E.g., id.
150.

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Hornsby v. Allen,

326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1964); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs,

264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); MODEL CODE, supra note 122, § 2-304;
supra note 23, at 156-58.
151
See Ward v. City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Jarrott
v. Scrivener, 225 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1964); Buell v. City of Bremerton,
80 Wash. 2d 581, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); BAscocK, supra note 23, at 155.
152. South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 901 (1974);
Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11
Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974); Dietrich v. District
of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 293 A.2d 470 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972); Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); Inland Constr.
Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374, 195 N.W.2d 558 (1972); Ward
v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 93 A.2d 385 (1952); Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 588-89, 507 P.2d 23, 30 (1973); BABcocK, supra
note 23, at 156-58; DAvis, supra note 23, § 2.15.
153. See MODEL CODE, supra note 122, § 2-304, Note, at 95.
154. K. DAVIS, DiscRTONARY JusTIcE 98, 104, 118 (1971).
BABcOcK,
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A prime example of a statute that delegates power to local
governments without requiring full procedural safeguards is the
Standard Zoning Enabling Act.155 The Model Land Development Code' 56 has attempted to correct the standard Act's deficiencies in this regard, and comparison is illuminating. The
Standard Act concentrates on prescribing local organizational
structure rather than procedure; it attempts to ensure fairness
by mandating tenure for administrative officials, extraordinary
157
majority vote for some decisions, and broad judicial review.
The principal defect is that it fails to require an administrative record sufficient to ensure a responsible decision by zoning
boards and to provide a basis for judicial review.'" 5 This state
of affairs leaves courts with no choice but to take evidence
outside the sparse record 59 and to assume a reviewing role that
is insufficiently defined. The courts have adopted a standard
of review built around the loose confines of substantive due
process rationality. 16 0 The Model Code, on the other hand, concentrates on prescribing procedural safeguards ensuring a reasoned decision on a more complete administrative record.161
Adjudications must include the ingredients of fair procedure outlined above.' 62 The Model Code thus enables judicial review
for the presence of substantial evidence on the record as a63whole,
a familiar process in state and federal administrative law.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LOCAL STANDARDS
AND PROCEDURES
Courts reviewing local standards and procedures could rely
in part on federal constitutional doctrine. But the existing
state of that doctrine falls well short of solving current prob155. SZEA, supra note 122. The statute is in effect, with modificaAEI cAN LAND PL.NmNG LAW §

tions, in 47 states. 1 N. WILLAmS,

18.01 (1975).
156. MODEL CODE, supra note 122.
157. SZEA, supra note 122, § 7; see MODEL CODE, supra note 122, §
2-301, Note, at 82-83.
158. See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los
Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 1.13 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974); MODEL
CODE, supra note 122, § 2-301, Note, at 83; § 2-304, Note, at 94, 95.
159. SZEA, supra note 122, § 7.

160. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,

Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAx. L. REv. 767, 783-85 (1969);
text accompanying notes 103-16 supra.
161. MODEL CODE, supra note 122, § 2-301, Note, at 82-83.
162. Id. § 2-304; see text accompanying notes 150-52 supra.
163. Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los
Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 112 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974); Louisville
v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971); MODEL CODE, supra note 122,
§ 9-110 (1) & Note, at 489-92.
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164 If
lems, at least in terms of the standards requirement.
Hornsby and Holmes are generally followed, the fourteenth
amendment will require local standards. But those decisions lack
support in Supreme Court precedent, 1 5 and in any case it seems
unlikely that the federal courts will go further than to require
standards of minimal specificity-enough perhaps to give affected persons some idea of how to meet them and to give procedural protections some bite. And once local governments satisfy the minimum specificity of standards required by the fourteenth amendment, the federal courts will presumably invoke the
abstention doctrine as a reason not to inquire into a need for more
detailed standards. 6 6 Furthermore, review of the substance of
existing standards will not be meaningful if current federal
doctrine is followed. The Boraas case strongly suggests that the
traditional, permissive rationality test will be the every-day tool
of review.'0 7 State courts should do more.
The state courts can apply state law to these questions
without the constraints of Supreme Court precedents defining
the limits of the fourteenth amendment, and without concern
for concepts of federalism. The goal is to derive principles from
the nature of the subject matter, local government, that will
define the appropriate stringency of judicial review. The courts
need guidance in deciding when to require more detailed local
standards, how closely to review existing ones, what procedural
safeguards to require, and when, alternatively, to require state
legislative standards. "We need, in short, some standards for
when we should require standards."'16 8 A preliminary effort to
meet that need follows.

A. PlnciPLEs GovmNmG THE STRMGENCY OF JuDiCIAL REviEw
Three broad categories of local government cases require
relatively close judicial review: those involving serious spill164. And perhaps in terms of procedural requirements as well. See
Gellhorn & Hornby, Constitutional Limitations on Admissions Procedures and Standards-Beyond Affirmative Action, 60 VA. L. REv. 975,
979-83 (1974); text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
165. Gellhorn & Hornby, supra note 164, at 990.
166. See Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262,
267 (2d Cir. 1968); Atlanta Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen, 389 F.2d 713,
716 (5th Cir. 1968).
167. See text accompanying notes 103-16 supra. See also San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-55 (1973). And threshold
doctrines such as standing may bar federal court review entirely. See
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
168. Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE LJ. 575, 587
(1972).
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over effects from local actions, the exercise of sensitive powers,
or the presence in local actions of significant effects on state
policy.
Discussion above maintained that the tendency of local actions to affect people outside the city limits provides a reason
for imposing judicial controls on local governments. 169 The nature of such spillover effects should therefore influence the
nature of judicial review. As the effects become greater in
extent or more intense in impact, judicial review should increase in stringency. The clearest case for relatively strict scrutiny occurs when cities exercise formal extraterritorial powers.
The courts should be vigilant, since the persons affected are without representation in the city government. For example, local
governments having a power of unilateral annexation sometimes
acquire territory for the apparent purpose of exploitative taxation.1 0 The courts should also distinguish coercive extraterritorial powers from noncoercive ones. Thus they should be more
lenient with noncoercive purchase of land beyond the city
limits than with extraterritorial eminent domain or land-use
regulation.1 71 It is important, however, for the courts to attend
not merely to the formalities of power but to its reality as well.
For example, the supposedly consensual sale of extraterritorial
utility services can reflect a dangerous monopoly power that allows the city to raise the utility rates arbitrarily. 72 The courts
must also be alert to the spillover effects of powers that are formally intramural. The courts should give close review to exclusionary zoning, since it may prevent some citizens from settling in the city. 73 By contrast, they should exercise more restraint in reviewing local actions that involve less significant eco169. See text accompanying notes 9-13 supra.
170. See Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916);
State ex rel. Pan American Prod. Co. v. City of Texas City, 157 Tex.
450, 303 S.W.2d 780 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 603 (1958). See

generally GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAs, supra note 10, at 628-32. Myles
Salt and Pan American Production reveal the laxity of fourteenth
amendment controls upon exploitative taxation. See also Morton Salt
Co. v. City of South Hutchinson, 177 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1949); McLennan
v. Aidredge, 223 Ga. 879, 159 S.E.2d 682 (1968); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constituior,
al Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 123035,

1246-49

171.
(1966).
172.

(1971).

See City of Osceola v. Whistle, 241 Ark. 604, 410 S.W.2d 393
See generally ANTEA'u, supra note 9, §§ 5.10-.12.
E.g., Phoenix v. Kasun, 54 Ariz. 470, 97 P.2d 210 (1939).

See

also City of Colorado Springs v. Kitty Hawk Dev. Co., 154 Colo. 535,
392 P.2d 467

173.

(1964).

See generally sources cited in notes 12 and 13 supra.
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nomic burdens on outsiders, such as local
occupational licensing
17 4
requirements that affect nonresidents. '
Second, the courts should build categories of sensitive city
powers involving identifiable dangers and give relatively stringent review to actions taken pursuant to them. In so doing, they
will be counterbalancing deficiencies in the cities' political process' 7 and governmental structure. 1'7 6 The courts should analyze
the nature of a power's impact on citizens, and evaluate the type
and importance of the governmental interests involved. Analogy
may be taken to the fundamental rights and suspect classifications that trigger strict scrutiny in federal constitutional law.
However, state courts need not limit their definitions or their
standards of review to comport with those employed by the federal courts. 77 Indeed, where federal constitutional issues lie in
the background, as with regulation of nude dancing,'7 8 courts
should ensure that local legislation is appropriately narrow. At
79
the state level fundamental rights may include property rights
and some important interests not within existing federal doctrine,
such as the interests in privacy, travel, and association raised
and rejected in the Boraas case. 80 Similarly, state courts could
define suspect classifications in a broader fashion than have the
federal courts, perhaps including classifications with serious im8
pact according to wealth.' '
The more closely a local government approaches state constitutional limits on its power, such as public purpose limits on
expenditures, the more closely the courts should review the local
action. 1 82 Some kinds of local governmental activities have a

special capacity for abuse. Examples might include the financ174. See generally Note, Occupational Licensing: An Argument for
State Control, 44 NoTRE DAwo LAw. 104 (1968).
175. See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
177. See note 103 supra.
178. E.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
179. Cf. Gunther, supra note 112, at 38. Property rights can include
the "new property." See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964). Thus, in Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974), the
court mandated close judicial scrutiny of local actions affecting funda-

mental rights, in this case retirement benefits.

180. See generally The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv.
41, 119-24 (1974); text accompanying note 112 supra.
181. In land-use regulation, this should include land uses that are
fiscally expensive to local governments, which accordingly tend to attempt their exclusion. See generally sources cited in notes 12 and 13
supra.
182. E.g., Hawkins v. City of Greenfield, 248 Ind. 593, 230 N.E.2d 396
(1967); Port Authority v. Fisher, 275 Minn. 157, 145 N.W.2d 560 (1966);
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ing of city improvements by special assessments against those
supposedly most benefited by them, 183 and the attempt of a city
council to punish for contempt.18 4 A local government exercising powers that involve clear self-interest, such as the regulation of claims against it, should be subject to close scrutiny. 8 5
Courts should also be alert to local legislation, such as anticompetitive regulation, 86 that tends to demonstrate domination of
the local governmental process by a majority of local business
interests. Conversely, if the power involved is of a kind traditionally subject to greater judicial deference, such as is true
of much economic regulation and the regulation of matters
involving technical expertise, the courts should exercise greater
restraint. And where local governments exercise novel powers
for which they may need some initial latitude, the courts can
87
cooperate.1
Third, the courts should adjust their review according to
the perceptible effects of local action on defined state policy.
For example, if a local government uses its zoning power to
exclude a kind of land use apparently favored by state policy,
such as the operation of a charitable institution, a state court
can review the action more strictly than it would an action not
contravening state policy.18 8 More stringent review is here a
less restrictive alternative to a state preemption holding, which
might destroy the power9 of the city to act at all in connection
18
with the subject matter.

B. InML MENTnG REQURE~MENTS FOR LoCAL STA-DARDS AN)
PROCEDURES

The foregoing principles can help the state courts decide the
abstract question of whether rigorous judicial review is warState ex Tel. Hanmermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205
N.W.2d 784 (1973).
183. See generaly GovERN~MNT IN URBAN ARE:AS, supra note 10, at
516-22.
184. See State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W.
750 (1915).
185. Sandalow, supra note 11, at 672-74.
186. E.g., Ferran v. City of Palo Alto, 50 Cal. App. 2d 374, 122 P.2d
965 (1942); Eskind v. City of Vero Beach, 159 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1963).
187. See note 99 supra.
188. See Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192
N.W.2d 322 (1971); Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township
of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Feller, Metropolitaniza-

tion and Land-Use Parochialism-Towarda Judicial Attitude, 69 Micr
L. REv. 655 (1971).
189. See text accompanying

notes 97 and 102 supra.
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ranted in a given case, but they do not answer the question of
what particular standards of review and remedies the courts
should choose. As the state courts begin to require local standards,190 either due to the prod of the fourteenth amendment or
on their own initiative, they will have to confront two closely
related questions. First, when should standards be required,
and in what detail? Second, how strict a standard of review
should the courts exercise in reviewing local standards once
promulgated? Ordinarily, these will tend to merge into the
single question of whether existing standards are sufficient.
But at times the issues may diverge. For example, one might
conclude that in Hornsby the aldermen should develop detailed
standards in order to guard against discriminatory dispensation
of valuable liquor licenses, but that, given the traditional breadth
of regulatory power in this field, subsequent review of the substance of those standards should be lenient.1 91 Thus the court
should insist that the council state in advance its grounds for
issuing licenses, but defer to the precise identity of those grounds
as long as they are reasonable.
The presence of a standards requirement increases the visibility of local policymaking, thus permitting effective judicial
review of the substance of the standards, whether the review be
strict or restrained. For example, a local zoning standard that
fails to provide for low-income housing should be more clearly
amenable to scrutiny for possible conflict with state housing
policy than should an apparently isolated refusal to rezone a
particular tract for low-income housing. 92 But since cities deal
with a wide variety of matters, the feasibility of stating prospective standards varies widely. When it seems unwise to require detailed standards in advance, courts can focus more
closely on procedural safeguards and on case-by-case rationality
review to ensure fair adjudication. The point is that no single
standard of review can adequately handle the varieties of potential local government action; courts should take a flexible approach that responds to the needs of the case at hand. They
should consider each technique for controlling local power-re190. See Application of Ellis, 277 N.C. 419, 178 S.E.2d 77 (1970).
191. See Barnes v. Merritt, 428 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1970); Atlanta
Bowling Center, Inc. v. Allen, 389 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
192. Compare, e.g., Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), with Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291
(9th Cir. 1970).
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quirement of substantive standards, of procedural safeguards,
and review of standards-in order to arrive at the correct
remedy.
State courts can adopt a more flexible approach to reviewing
the substance of local standards than the rigid federal two-tier
equal protection system, which calls for either rationality review or strict scrutiny. One possibility is to adopt the intermediate standard of "strict rationality" recently suggested for the
federal cases. That test was applied by the court of appeals in
Boraas but rejected by implication by the Supreme Court.193 It
would ask whether the local rule is substantially related in fact
to a legitimate governmental purpose, and would require record
proof of the relationship instead of judicial speculation. The
strict rationality test attempts onl'y to assure that the means
chosen by a legislature is actually related to a legitimate purpose and purports to eschew review of the ends sought if they
are within the bounds of legitimacy. 9 4 Such a mode of review
would improve current doctrine in the local government context,
but its present formulation seems insufficient in at least two respects. First, a state court reviewing local standards should adjust its review in response to the ends that the local government
is seeking.195 Second, a rationality test related only to means
fails to reach governmental actions having a substantial tendency
to advance a legitimate end but also having seriously undesirable
side effects, such as spillovers.' 96
Nonetheless, the strict rationality test can contribute to local
government law by requiring an actual relationship between a
rule and its purposes. Even situations calling for comparatively
relaxed judicial review merit such an inquiry. The courts can
adjust the city's burden of persuasion as circumstances warrant. 97 For example, in several recent cases involving apparent
193. See note 112 supra. See generally Gellhorn & Hornby, supra
note 164, at 985-89.
194. Gunther, supra note 112, at 43-46.
195. See text accompanying notes 169-89 supra. For an argument
that the Supreme Court has begun taking this approach, see Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classifications,62 GEO. L.J. 1071
(1974).
196. Gunther, supra note 112, at 45.
197. Gunther, supra note 112, observed that the strict rationality
test would be difficult to apply to ordinamces pursuing broad goals heavily laden with value preferences-aesthetic zoning is a striking example.
The reason is that such ordinances rest largely on subjective policy considerations not amenable to record proof or persuasive elaboration.
Cities should be required to include statements of reasons with their
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conflicts between city ordinances and state policies, the courts

have reversed the presumption of validity traditionally attending
local legislation and have required the cities to justify their actions.

19 s

VII.

REQUIREMENTS FOR STATUTORY STANDARDS

The adoption of standards and procedural safeguards by
city governments involves inherent problems of coordination,
regardless of the good faith of the cities. Some unhappy substantive effects result from broad statutory delegations of power that permit a mosaic of local regulation. Examples are conflicting building codes that retard standardization in housing, 99
or occupational licensing ordinances that result in multiple burdens on those doing business in a metropolitan area. 20 0 Broad
delegations of zoning power cause similar problems-the question
of how many mobile homes or how much low-income housing a
particular city should allow cannot have a final answer in standards promulgated by that city. The solutions depend on
what other cities in the metropolitan area and the state are
doing to respond to forces partly national in scope. Since local
governments lack the jurisdiction to impose statewide solutions
to problems affecting them, it may not be enough for them to
attempt to take interests beyond their borders into account in
their own actions. 20 ' The state legislature must provide some
answers that need not be provided when it delegates problems
to an agency of statewide competence.
The state courts presently take account of these considerations in the delegation doctrine, framing the issue in terms of
rules, to facilitate judicial review. See text accompanying notes 138-39
supra. The statement in text means that judicial scrutiny of the statements of reasons should vary in stringency. And when judicial review
of the substance of rules cannot be very effective, other controls should
be emphasized. In aesthetic zoning, for example, cities should be forced
to adopt rather detailed standards and procedural safeguards to ensure
fairness in application.
198. See sources cited in note 188 supra; cf. City of Osceola v.
Whistle, 241 Ark. 604, 410 S.W.2d 393 (1966) (Dillon's rule advanced as
justification for requiring a city to prove the necessity of exercising
a sensitive power of extraterritorial eminent domain).
199. See U.S. ADWISORY Comn'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
BUILDING CODES: A PROGRAIM FOR INTERGOVERNmENTAL REFORMV 1, 11
(1968).
200. See generally Note, Occupational Licensing: An Argument for
State Control, 44 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 104 (1968).
201. But see Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); BABcocx, supra note 23,
at 159-65.
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the delegability of matters of local concern and the nondelegability of matters of statewide concern. 20 2 It was remarked
above that these categories are oversimplified. 20 3 Accordingly,
the courts need to reformulate the delegation doctrine to give
it greater flexibility and responsiveness to the issues. First, they
should continue to recognize a category of matters that may not
be delegated at all because local diversity of action is clearly inappropriate. Examples might include the designation of the side
of the street on which one drives, or the definition of murder.
To be sure, little that the legislature is likely to attempt to delegate will fall into such a category; its use should be sparing. But
it could resolve some very important cases. For example, a state
court could conclude that local diversity in the capacity to raise
school revenues is inappropriate because of the importance of education and could therefore invalidate school financing schemes
under the delegation doctrine. The courts are presently more
likely to cast their holdings in terms of the state equal protection clause, 20 4 or possibly state preemption; 20 5 the point is
simply that they can also rest on the delegation doctrine, because
the complaint really concerns undue decentralization.
Second, the courts should recognize that although only a
few matters are altogether incompatible with local diversity,
more may call for state legislative limitations on local discretion.
For example, whether each community should accept at least
some low-income housing (and how much) could be viewed as a
matter for state legislative decision. Only by requiring detailed
standards to appear in the delegating statute itself can courts
force resolution of such problems. By contrast, sporadic judicial
decrees attempting to force reform by individual local governments could result in unequal demands on the cities to accept
fiscally expensive land uses. It should be apparent from the
courts' current difficulties in enforcing requirements for legislative standards, and from the need for broad local initiative, that
wholesale invalidation of broad delegations is not the answer.2 00
The suggested alternative is that courts attempt a restrained
202. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., cases cited in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 133 n.100 (1973).
205. Of course, a preemption holding is possible only if there is no
explicit delegation of the particular power in question to the cities; a
holding that statutory authorization is absent is then an alternative. See
text accompanying note 102 supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 63-70, 90-95 supra.
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identification of those questions that must be further resolved
at the state level because of a need for minimum equality and
fairness in treatment of those unrepresented in local government.
The courts should thus recognize three categories of delegation cases: nondelegable issues for which the state must provide
the substantive rule of decision; issues having sufficient general
importance to call for legislative controls on substantive local
discretion; and issues appropriate for delegation to the cities
without legislative standards. The principles governing the
stringency of judicial review that were outlined above should be
applied to determine whether the state legislature should be
called upon to provide greater substantive controls. 20 7 For example, where local action has important spillover effects or involves sufficiently sensitive powers, or may conflict with important state policies, local standards should perhaps be supplemented by greater state legislative control. To favor local standards is not to deny an appropriate state role in confining, but
not removing, local discretion. The important point is the need
to take a flexible approach to the issues that will allow the legislature, the courts, and the cities to assume their proper rules.
VIII. HOME RULE: THE STATE COURTS AND LIMITS
UPON LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
Some state constitutions confer authority upon the cities to
govern themselves by framing and adopting "home rule" charters. 20 8 A question thus arises regarding the extent to which the
existence of home rule power affects judicial review. One primary
function of home rule is to confer a general power to initiate
local legislation without specific statutory authorization. 20 9 This
207. See text accompanying notes 169-89 supra.
208. See generally ANrAu, supra note 9, §§ 3.00-.11; Sandalow,
supra note 11, at 668-71.
209. ANT=AU, supra note 9, §§ 3.01, .08, .10; Sandalow, supra note
11, at 649-50, 658-60. Professor Sandalow has analyzed the limits of local
initiative in detail. Id. at 671-721. He has sought to define limits for the
initiative power by identifying subject-matter categories of inappropriate
or sensitive exercises of local power deserving legislative reexamination.
Broadly speaking, he would deny the initiative when a local government
asserts novel or important powers threatening fundamental values, even
though they fit within the loose bounds of current constitutional doctrine. This Article has advanced a series of similar principles for the
stringency of judicial review in local government law, to be implemented
by requirements for local and state standards and local procedural safeguards. See text accompanying notes 169-89 supra.
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removes some of the uncertainties concerning the scope of local
power that result from basic theories of legislative supremacy
and multiply due to the application of Dillon's rule. The respect
in which home rule cities are unique for purposes of this Article
is the frequent presence of some autonomy from state legislative
interference. 210 Although that autonomy does not distinguish
home rule cities insofar as judicial requirements for locally
adopted standards and procedure are concerned, 211 it may prevent legislative standards confining local discretion. But since the
principles offered above for requiring state legislative standards
for local action are based on the identification of issues having
importance transcending the locality, they should apply to home
rule cities as well, with the caveat that since a state constitutional decision is involved, the courts should be more restrained
12
in applying them to home rule cities.1
Existing doctrine governing the autonomy of home rule cities, however, is not entirely consistent with this point of view.
Autonomy is most frequently held to extend to matters concerning local structure, personnel, and procedure. 218 In part
the theory may be that these matters relate only indirectly
to the exercise of substantive powers, which are often subject to
legislative control.214 Of course, such an approach is oversimplified.21 5 A deeper objection to state interference in the selec210. See AN'EAu, supra note 9, §§ 3.14-.16; GOVERNMNT 3H URBAN
AREAs, supra note 10, at 308-09, 349-50; Sandalow, supra note 11, at 65859, 668-69.

211. For judicial review, the most important technical difference between the categories of cities is that the delegation doctrine does not ap-

ply to subject matter within constitutional home rule powers. The reason is that the separation of powers principle is rendered inapplicable
by any explicit state constitutional allocation of powers. But since the
need for judicial control of local power is the same whether a city has
home rule power or not, see text accomp;mying notes 7-24 supra, a judicial requirement for local standards and safeguards is still appropriate.
It will have to be based on the state constitution's due process or equal
protection clause, however. The stages in the review process then become: whether the statutory implementation of the home rule grant is
within the terms of the state constitution; whether the home rule city's
charter provisions are within the constitution and the implementing legislation; whether the ordinance or action involved is within both the
charter powers and state and federal constitutional limitations.
212. See text accompanying note 207 ,rupra.
213. See e.g., Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St. 2d
113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965); State ex rel. Canada v. Phillips, 168 Ohio
St. 191, 151 N.E.2d 722 (1958). See generally GovERNMjNT n URBAN
AREAs, supra note 10, at 350, 368.
214. GovmN=T iN URBAN AREAS, supranote 10, at 368.
215. See, e.g., Boyle v. City of Bend, 234 Ore. 91, 380 P.2d 625 (1963)

19761

JUDICIAL REVIEW

tion of local officials seems also to be present; 216 home rule
autonomy doctrine reflects a reaction to undue legislative med217
dling in city affairs during the last century.
Nevertheless, an attempt to prevent legislative abuses should
avoid, if possible, the collateral consequence of removing legislative power to prevent local abuses. The effort of the courts
should be to define an appropriate role for the state legislature. A
useful governing principle might be that the legislature may prescribe local structure and procedure, but only by general rule, not
by intervention in a particular case. This principle derives from
the policy underlying state constitutional provisions that prohibit
legislation directed only to selected local governments. 2 18 These
provisions do not prevent detailed regulation of local matters,
but they do prevent legislation creating differential treatment.
And since the needs of cities for authorizing legislation vary, bans
upon special legislation have often been diluted by a doctrine
that the legislature may create reasonable classifications-by
population for instance. 21 9 Thus a state court should rarely
conclude that a local government is beyond all legislative supervision on a matter, for essentially the same reason that it should
only rarely conclude that an issue may not be delegated at all.
The unifying principle is shared responsibility, which includes
a responsibility on the part of the legislature to superintend the
exercise of decentralized state power.

(emphasizing that the availability of such important procedural safeguards as judicial review of special assessments may be more important
than the substantive rule applied and should not be considered a matter
within local autonomy).
216. This reaction surfaced in the first case advancing the ill-fated
notion of an inherent right to local self-government, People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871). See note 43 supra. Cf. Stewart
v. City of Cheyenne, 60 Wyo. 497, 154 P.2d 355 (1944).
217. See GovrmnmmT ir URBAN AREAs, supra note 10, at 332-34.
218. See generally ANTmAu, supra note 9, § 2.14.
219. Sandalow, supra note 11, at 654-55.

